Loading the longlist of options
Each column is one option, numbered as in the longlist. The upper chart shows how achievable it looks at a 2027 G20. The rows below show likely positions: the US, China, the EU and the UK, then France, Germany and Italy only where they part company with the EU. The last row flags options where other members are likely to cause trouble. Hover an option for its summary, or any dot for the reasoning behind that position; click to jump to the option. On a small screen, scroll sideways.
Everything is on the table here, from restating what exists to new rules outside consensus. Each option has political strengths and weaknesses to start from. Open "Detail" for the precedent, delivery body, positions and the main risk.
Ordering. Options run from least to most ambitious. Ambition means how far an option moves beyond what the G20, or the US, has already agreed. The lower bands lean on precedent; the higher bands break new ground, ask more of members and have fewer existing texts to point to.
Scores and positions. Ambition, achievability and every country position are judgements drawn from October 2026 research on G20 outcomes since 2008 and on what Trump administrations sign. They are there to start a discussion, not settle it.
US view. Based on what the administration has signed or drafted (Osaka 2019, Pax Silica, New Delhi 2026, Chapel Hill 2026) and what it has rejected by name (Paris 2025, a G7 AI declaration at Évian, "global governance" of AI at the UN).
Europe and the UK. The UK row shows the likely position of the host government. The EU row reflects the Commission and the broad EU line. France, Germany and Italy are shown separately only where their governments' recent stances point elsewhere. Those splits rest on thinner evidence than the US and China positions.
Not mutually exclusive. A realistic package combines several options: a short consensus text, delegated work in band 3, and a welcomed annex from band 5.
Checks needed. Some 2026 points rest on single or lower-quality sources: the reported White House instruction on the UK AI Security Institute, details of Évian, the substance of the US–China AI dialogue, and the UK's reported presidency priorities. The Miami summit (14–15 December) may shift the baseline.
Major AI policy stories involving G20 members and the EU, collected automatically once a day from news searches and filtered for government action: rules, strategies, deals, chips and security. Headlines link to the original reporting. An automatic filter misses some stories and lets the odd irrelevant one through.
Pick options to form a package and see who would likely sign, who needs work and who would block. A government blocks if any option in the package is one it is unlikely to accept. Start from a preset or build your own. Positions are the same judgements used across the dashboard.
What each government is likely to refuse, what it wants, and the options most at risk from it. Option numbers link to the longlist. These are judgements from public positions as of October 2026; the European and smaller-member assessments rest on thinner evidence.
The lesson of Chapel Hill is that AI substance gets agreed at ministerial level and leaders endorse it. This is a proposed sequence. The UK has not yet published its 2027 calendar, so timings are indicative. Option numbers link to the longlist.
They sign more than their rhetoric suggests, across both terms. The texts share a recognisable shape.
Both signed the New Delhi Declaration (February 2026) and joined consensus on the Carolina Principles (September 2026), so those texts are the safest place to borrow wording. The US tolerated some development language there, such as benefits being "equitably shared". China's preferred terms come from its 2023 Global AI Governance Initiative and its July 2025 Global AI Governance Action Plan; it reads "trusted" and "like-minded" framing as aimed at itself, and wants the UN, not the G20, at the centre.
| Date | Instrument | Format | Binding? | Key features |
|---|
Real, but transactional and short-lived. Deals are narrow swaps agreed at leader level, time-limited, and recorded in separate national readouts that often differ. In September 2026 the two agreed their first AI channel under Trump II: a dialogue (Washington calls it "Super Intelligence", Beijing calls it AI) and an incident channel. A channel, not commitments.
| Date | Agreement | Content | How durable |
|---|
Yes. A G20 text gives the widest legitimacy but only lowest-common-denominator content. A US–China channel is where frontier risk is actually being discussed, but it is fragile. A smaller group can carry ambition, at the cost of splitting the room. The G20 already has tools for combining them.
| Dimension | G20 consensus text | US–China bilateral | Smaller group of G20 members |
|---|